Michelle Obama: the  Darker Side  of Presidential Spousal Involvement and Activism by Parks, Gregory S & Roberson, PhD, Quinetta M
Cornell Law Library
Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository
Cornell Law Faculty Working Papers Faculty Scholarship
8-7-2008
Michelle Obama: the "Darker Side" of Presidential
Spousal Involvement and Activism
Gregory S. Parks
dr.gsparks@gmail.com
Quinetta M. Roberson, PhD
Villanova University, quinetta.roberson@villanova.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clsops_papers
Part of the Civil Law Commons, Jurisprudence Commons, Labor and Employment Law
Commons, Law and Society Commons, Psychology and Psychiatry Commons, and the Women
Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Cornell Law Faculty Working Papers by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For
more information, please contact jmp8@cornell.edu.
Recommended Citation
Parks, Gregory S. and Roberson, PhD, Quinetta M., "Michelle Obama: the "Darker Side" of Presidential Spousal Involvement and
Activism" (2008). Cornell Law Faculty Working Papers. Paper 39.
http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clsops_papers/39
 1 
MICHELLE OBAMA 
THE “DARKER SIDE” OF PRESIDENTIAL SPOUSAL INVOLVEMENT AND ACTIVISM 
Quinetta M. Robersonα& Gregory S. Parksφ  
 
Meet the new political wife. She has a career; she has opinions—a partner in every way. 
... And now, she's become controversial.—Ted Koppel1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The 2008 presidential campaign is historic given the presence of a Black (Barack Obama) 
candidate and a woman (Hillary Clinton) candidate.   Not only is it historic that Americans had a 
real opportunity to elect the first Black or woman president, it is also the first time that 
Americans are faced with the prospects of having the first Black First Lady—Michelle Obama.  
As such, the presidential campaign provides a useful context in which to analyze how race and 
gender attitudes influence voting behavior.2  Recently, commentators have analogized the 2008 
presidential election campaign to a hiring decision in the employment context.3  Underlying this 
analogy is that voters stand in the shoes of employers, and candidates stand in the shoes of 
prospective employees.  Thus, the same principles and modes of analysis that apply to 
employment discrimination may apply to voting behavior.  If it is apropos to analogize elections 
to hiring decisions, new frontiers in employment discrimination law that involve the intersection 
of race and gender,4 the role of implicit bias,5and third-party associative discrimination6 are 
implicated. 
                                                 
α Professor, Villanova School of Business. B.S., University of Delaware; M.B.A., University of Pittsburgh; 
Ph.D., University of Maryland. 
φ Clerk, U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland (2009-2010); Clerk, District of Columbia Court of 
Appeals (2008-2009). B.S., Howard University; M.S., City University of New York; M.A., Ph.D., University of 
Kentucky; J.D., Cornell Law School. 
1
 Joan Vennochi, A Delicate Line for Michelle Obama, B. GLOBE, March 2, 2008, at 9D (quoting Ted 
Koppel’s reference to First Lady Hillary Clinton). 
2
 See generally Gregory S. Parks & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Unconscious Bias and the 2008 Election (under 
review). 
 
3
 See id.  
4
 See Moore v. Hughes Helicopters, Inc., 708 F.2d 475 (9th Cir. 1982); Payne v. Travenol Lab., Inc., 673 
F.2d 798 (5th Cir. 1982); Jeffries v. Harris County Cmty Action Ass’n, 615 F.2d 1025 (5th Cir. 1980); 
 2 
If voters harbor race and gender stereotypes and biases about Senator Obama and did 
about Senator Clinton, respectively, it is reasonable to believe that both types of preconceptions 
may influence voters’ perceptions about Mrs. Obama.  Some researchers have proposed models 
that suggest the role of First Ladies.  Lang offered a model of status based upon a woman’s 
relationship with her spouse.7  According to that model, women may possess one of the 
following types of status: 1) satellite status, which implies that a woman defines herself through 
her spouse and possesses no independent ideas; 2) sponsored status, which implies that a woman 
achieves recognition by her relationship with a prominent spouse; and 3) autonomous status, 
which implies that a woman’s conferred recognition is based on her own ideas and actions 
independent of her spouse.8  Watson presents a similar typology, which pertains specifically to 
first ladies and categorizes them on a continuum from non-partners to full partners based on her 
relationship with her spouse.9  He argues that because of their professionalization, integration 
into the political agenda, and activism, only Eleanor Roosevelt, Rosalyn Carter, and Hillary 
Clinton have achieved full partnership.10  While such spousal roles have earned these First 
Ladies acclaim for their knowledge of, and involvement in, the political agenda, these women 
have also received the most criticism for their roles as “co-presidents.”11 That is, until now. 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
DeGraffenreid v. Gen. Motors Assembly Div., 558 F.2d 480 (8th Cir. 1977); Jenkins v. Blue Cross Mutual Hosp. 
Ins., Inc., 538 F.2d 164 (7th Cir. 1976); Rogers v. American Airlines, Inc., 527 F.Supp. 229 (S.D. N.Y. 1981); 
Carswell v. Peachford Hosp., No. C80-222A, 1981 WL 224, at *1 (N.D. GA. May 26, 1981); Paulette M. Caldwell, 
A Hairpiece: Perspectives on the Intersection of Race and Gender, 1991 DUKE L.J. 365 (1991). 
5
 See infra note 95 to 198 and accompanying text. 
 
6
 See infra notes 206 to 227 and accompanying text.   
7
 See HEARTH AND HOME: IMAGES OF WOMEN IN THE MASS MEDIA (Gaye Tuchman et al.,  eds., Oxford 
Univ. Press 1978). 
8
 Gladys Engel Lang, The Most Admired Woman: Image-making in the News, in HEARTH AND HOME: 
IMAGES OF WOMEN IN THE MASS MEDIA 147 (Gaye Tuchman et al., eds., Oxford Univ. Press 1978). 
9
 R. P. WATSON.  THE PRESIDENT'S WIVES: REASSESSING THE OFFICE OF THE FIRST LADY(Lyrme Rienner, 
1999). 
10
 Id. 
11
 G. D. Wekkin. (2000). Role Constraints and First Ladies. SOC. SCI. J., 37(4), 601-10.; G. Troy. (2000). 
Mr. & Mrs. President? The Rise and Fall of the Co-Presidency. SOC. SCI. J., 37(4), 591-600. 
 3 
Michelle Obama, wife of presidential candidate Senator Barack Obama, contravenes 
conventional stereotypes of presidential candidates’ wives.  First, she has been direct and plain-
spoken—described as “tough, and even a little steely.”12  In February of 2008, Republicans 
branded her as unpatriotic.13  The critique stemmed from her comment, in discussing the level of 
political engagement she was witnessing among Americans, “For the first time in my adult 
lifetime, I am really proud of my country.”14  Second, when asked about what role she sees for 
herself as the potential First Lady, she noted that work-family balance would be one of her top 
priorities.15  This is not surprising given that she seems concerned about empowering women.   
Speaking of that broader concern, during a speech she gave in Las Vegas, she noted, “We sat 
back too long, suffering in silence, avoiding these challenges.  We can't do that any longer.  We 
need a man,” stopping to correct herself, “a person who happens to be a man, who is ready to 
help us turn the page to bring a new conversation to the table, to change the lives of women and 
children across America.”16 
 
Mrs. Obama also has not been shy about expressing her views on race issues.  At 
Princeton, Mrs. Obama was interested in social change and ran a literacy program for local 
neighborhood kids.17  She also wrote her senior sociology thesis on “Princeton-Educated Blacks 
and the Black Community.”18  In it she wrote that Princeton “made me far more aware of my 
                                                 
12
 Richard Wolfe, Barack’s Rock, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 28, 2007, at 5. 
13
 Joan Vennochi, A Delicate Line for Michelle Obama, B. GLOBE, March 2, 2008, at 9D; Lisa Wangsness, 
Michelle Obama's Candor Cuts 2 Ways Backers Delighted, but Her Critics Fume, B. GLOBE, Feb. 21, 2008, at 1B. 
14
 Wangsness, supra note 13.  Michelle was clear to indicate that what she meant was that she was “proud 
of this country, and I'm proud of the fact that people are ready to roll up their sleeves and do something 
phenomenal.” Id.  
15
 Liz Halloran, From the Soccer Field to the Stump, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Feb. 11, 2008, at 14. 
16
 Gwen Ifill, Beside Barack, ESSENCE, Sept. 2007, at 5. 
17
 Richard Wolfe, Barack’s Rock, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 28, 2007, at 5. 
18
 Id.  
 4 
‘blackness’ than ever before.”19  She went on to write that “[r]egardless of the circumstances 
under which I interact with Whites at Princeton it often seems as if, to them, I will always be 
Black first and a student second.”20  At Harvard Law School, she protested that institution’s 
paucity of minority students and professors.21  On the campaign trail today, she has noted her 
awareness that some voters were concerned about Barack Obama’s electability due to his race.  
In response, she has been more than willing to draw parallels between Senator Obama’s 
candidacy and Black freedom fighters of the past.22  She also has been quite willing to indicate 
that such hesitance is “the bitter legacy of racism and discrimination and oppression in this 
country.”23 
 
Mrs. Obama is an ardent supporter and fierce defender of her husband.  After one of his 
debates, Mrs. Obama called his campaign team and bluntly made her concerns clear.  She 
indicted that she thought Senator Clinton had packed the crowd with her supporters, and that 
Senator Obama had been booed whenever he criticized Senator Clinton.  She told Senator 
Obama’s aides that she did not want that to happen again.  One senior Obama aide who attended 
the meeting described the incident as one of “a spouse saying, ‘Do not do this to my husband 
again’.”24   
 
                                                 
19
 Id. 
20
 Id. 
21
 Id. 
22
 See Allison Samuels, Daring to Touch the Third Rail: Barack Obama Avoids Talking about the 'Race 
Issue,' but His Wife Doesn't, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 28, 2008, at 39. 
23
 Margaret Talev, Obama’s Wife Reaches Out to Black Women, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Nov. 22, 2007, at 
7A. 
24
 Wolfe, supra note 17. 
 5 
Despite her support for her husband, Mrs. Obama is no “traditional Stepford booster, 
smiling vacantly at her husband and sticking to a script of carefully vetted blandishments.”25  She 
is, in her words, making sure Senator Obama is “keeping it real.”26  She does this by holding him 
responsible for his responsibilities, even the most mundane, as a husband and father.  For 
instance, she insists that Senator Obama return to Chicago despite being on the campaign trail to 
attend his daughters’ ballet recitals and parent-teacher conferences.27  Additionally, she has 
poked fun at her husband—commenting on his snoring, morning breath, failure to put his socks 
in the hamper, and leaving the butter out after breakfast.28  When introduced at a speech in 
Wisconsin, the woman who introduced Michelle accidentally said that she was “honored to 
introduce the next president!”  Mrs. Obama stepped to the podium with a big smile and told the 
crowd, “I like that promotion that I got.  I don't know if Barack knows yet.  We can announce it 
on the news tonight.  He's going to be the First Lady.”29  Her tactic, in her words, was to 
humanize her husband for the public, so that when he turns out not to be perfect, they will not be 
disappointed.30  Ultimately she scaled back such comments, realizing that some supporters 
believed her comments were emasculating.31  
 
Despite her outspokenness, Michelle Obama’s educational and professional background 
is also notable.  Mrs. Obama grew up on the South Side of Chicago to working-class parents.  
She excelled in school, skipping second grade and went on to earn her undergraduate degree 
                                                 
25
 Id. 
26
 Id.  
27
 Id.  
28
 Id.; Melinda Henneberger, The Obama Marriage, SLATE, Oct. 26, 2007, at 5. 
29
 Wolfe, supra note 17.  
30
 Henneberger, supra note 28. 
31
 Id. 
 6 
from Princeton and a law degree from Harvard.32  After law school, she practiced law at the 
Chicago offices of the law firm Sidley Austin and most recently worked as a Vice President for 
the University of Chicago Hospitals.33  Arguably, by all accounts, Mrs. Obama is an 
unconventional spouse to a presidential candidate and would likely be so as First Lady. 
 
Part I of this Article investigates the role that explicit attitudes about race and gender play 
on voting decisions and the intersection that the two play in employment decisions.  Scholarship 
from the areas of political science and law illustrate the challenges that Michelle Obama faces as 
a candidate’s spouse and the potential First Lady.  Part II investigates unconscious race and 
gender biases and the role they play in behavior including voting and employment 
discrimination.  Despite the racial progress that the U.S. has made, scholarship from the areas of 
cognitive and social psychology as well as law illustrate deep-seated biases Michelle Obama 
must overcome.  Part III investigates the role of third-party employment discrimination, where 
employees (typically White) are discriminated against because of the race of their associates 
(typically Black).  We extrapolate from jurisprudence in this area to make some inferences about 
how attitudes about Michelle Obama may work against her husband’s candidacy for the 
presidency of the U.S.  Part IV is a conclusion.  
 
                                                 
 
32
 Karen Springen & Jonathan Darman, Ground Support, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 29, 2007, at 40.  
 
33
 Id.   
 7 
 
I. 
RACE AND GENDER: VOTING AND INTERSECTIONALITY IN EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 
 
Race and gender are powerful variables that influence people’s decision-making and 
behavior in a variety of contexts.  Politics and employment are among them.  But in addition to 
these variables in isolation, their intersection has multiplicative predictive value. 
 
      A.  Employment Discrimination 
If we assume that Senator Clinton’s assessment that elections are like “hiring decisions”34 
then voter discrimination creates an analog for employment discrimination. Thus, Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 is implicated by the roles of race and gender in the 2008 presidential 
election.  Under Title VII, employers may not discriminate because—among other factors— 
race, color, and sex.35  The landmark cases that provide the litmus test for race and sex 
discrimination in the workplace are McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green36 and Price Waterhouse 
v. Hopkins,37 respectively.  Under McDonnell, a complainant establishes a prima facie case for 
racial discrimination where he shows that (i) he is a racial minority; (ii) he applied and was 
qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) despite his qualifications, 
he was rejected; and (iv) after his rejection, the position remained open and the employer 
continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant's qualifications.38  The employer then 
bears the burden of articulating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for rejecting the 
employee.39  The employer cannot, however, use the employee’s conduct as a pretext for the 
                                                 
34
 Jim Acosta, et al., Clinton: Thing about This as a Hiring Decision, CNN.COM POLITICS, May 18, 2008, 
http://www.cnn.com/2008/POLITICS/05/18/campaign.wrap/index.html. 
35
 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(a)(1). 
36
 411 U.S. 792 (1973).  
37
 490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
38
 411 U.S. 792, 802. 
39
 Id. at 802-03. 
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discrimination nor may it engage in racial double-standards.40  Then, the employee must 
demonstrate that the reason proffered by the employer was not the true reason for the 
employment decision.  This may be done directly by demonstrating that a discriminatory reason 
more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the employer's proffered 
explanation is unworthy of credence.41   
 
In Price Waterhouse, the Supreme Court found clear signs that some of the company’s 
partners reacted negatively to a female employee’s personality because she was a woman.42  
Partners described her as “macho,” suggested that she “overcompensated for being a woman,” 
advised her to take “a course at charm school.”43  Another representative of the company 
described the employee as someone who “ha[d] matured from a tough-talking somewhat 
masculine hard-nosed [manager] to an authoritative, formidable, but much more appealing lady 
[partner] candidate.”44  Most significant was the statement from one board member as to what 
the employee needed to do in order to improve her chances to be promoted to partner.  He 
advised her that she should “walk more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely, 
wear make-up, have her hair styled, and wear jewelry.”45  Expert witness, social psychologist Dr. 
Susan Fiske, testified that the partnership selection process at Price Waterhouse was likely 
influenced by sex stereotyping.46  Her testimony focused on the overtly sex-based comments of 
partners as well as on gender-neutral remarks made by partners who knew Hopkins only slightly, 
                                                 
40
 Id. at 804.  
41
 Tex. Dep’t of  Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981). 
42
 490 U.S. 228, 235. 
43
 Id.  
44
 Id. 
45
 Id. 
46
 Id. 
 9 
that were intensely critical of her.47  According to Fiske, Hopkins’ status as the only woman in 
the pool of candidates and the subjectivity of the evaluations made it likely that the sharply 
critical remarks were the product of sex stereotyping.48  The Court found that in previous years, 
other female candidates for partnership were also evaluated in sex-based terms.49  Those who 
maintained their femininity were viewed favorably while “women’s lib[b]er” was used as a 
pejorative term for other female employees.50 
 
The Court held, in Price Waterhouse, that sex-stereotyped remarks in the employment 
setting do not inevitably prove that gender played a part in a particular employment decision.  
The employee must show that the employer actually relied on her gender in making its decision.  
In making this showing, stereotyped remarks can be evidence that gender played a part.51  It went 
on to hold that the premise of a case in which there is a possible legitimate as well as 
discriminatory motive for the employment decision,  the employer must show that its legitimate 
reason, standing alone, would have induced it to make the same decision.52 
 
B. Voting Behavior 
 
Voting is not always based on rational choice; emotions too play a significant role.53  
William Christ, for example, found that emotional responses to candidates accurately predict 
voter preferences for more than 90% of the decided voters and 80% of the undecided voters.54   
                                                 
47
 Id. 
48
 Id. at 235-36. 
49
 Id. at 236 
50
 Id. 
51
 Id. at 251.  
52
 Id. at 252. 
53
 See generally DREW WESTEN, THE POLITICAL BRAIN: THE ROLE OF EMOTION IN DECIDING THE FATE OF 
THE NATION (PublicAffairs,2007). 
54
 William G. Christ, Voter Preference and Emotion: Using Emotional Response to Classify Decided and 
Undecided Voters, 15 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 237, 250 (1985).  
 10 
Most political advertisements are designed to either inspire voter enthusiasm, thereby motivating 
their political engagement and loyalty, or induce fear, thereby stimulating vigilance against the 
risks some candidate supposedly pose.55  Other research shows that political advertisements that 
provoke anxiety stimulate attention toward the campaign and discourage reliance on habitual 
cues for voting; in short, it can induce crossover voting.56  Likeability also affects voting.  In one 
study, disengaged voters who watched entertainment-oriented talk show interviews of Al Gore 
and George W. Bush were more likely to vote against their party loyalties when they found the 
crossover candidate likeable.57  As with most decisions, both passion and reason influence 
voting, so it is no surprise that emotionally evocative concepts like race and gender impact 
voting.  
 
1. Race and Voting 
Race has long held currency among Americans in their determinations of who to elect to 
public office.  Black and White voters typically prefer candidates of their own race in elections 
where one candidate is Black and the other is White.  Consequently, Black candidates rarely 
succeed outside of political jurisdictions in which Blacks are a majority of the voters.58   
                                                 
55
 Ted Brader, Striking a Responsive Chord: How Political Ads Motivate and Persuade Voters by 
Appealing to Emotions, 49 AM. J. POL. SCI. 388, 393-97 (2005).  
56
 George Marcus & Michael Mackuen, Anxiety, Enthusiasm, and the Vote: The Emotional Underpinnings 
of Learning and Involvement During Presidential Campaigns, 87 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 627, 677-78 (1993). 
57
 Matthew A. Baum, Talking the Vote: Why Presidential Candidates Hit the Talk Show Circuit, 49 AM. J. 
POL. SCI. 213, 223-30 (2005). 
58
 See LUCIUS J. BARKER ET AL., AFRICAN AMERICANS AND THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM 246-47 
(Prentice Hall,1999); HANES WALTON, JR. & ROBERT C. SMITH, AMERICAN POLITICS AND THE AFRICAN AMERICAN 
QUEST FOR UNIVERSAL FREEDOM 199-205 (Longman, 2000).  At the state level, only one of the fifty “elected” state 
governors is Black (Deval Patrick of Massachusetts); Senator Obama is the only Black member of the U.S. Senate.  
Up to year 2000, only four Blacks had ever served in the U.S. Senate, and only two since Reconstruction.  Id. The 
House of Representatives is more representative, with nearly 10% of its members being Black, but this success is 
attributable to racial gerrymandering of House Districts.  In areas dominated by Whites, Black electoral success is 
rare.  In a variety of electoral contexts this relationship has been demonstrated.  David A. Bostis, The Future of 
Majority-Minority Districts and African-American and Hispanic Legislative Representation, in REDISTRICTING AND 
MINORITY REPRESENTATION: LEARNING FROM THE PAST, PREPARING FOR THE FUTURE  9-42 (David A. Bostis ed., 
1998); Lisa Handley et al., Electing Minority-Preferred Candidates to Legislative Office: The Relationship Between 
 11 
Experimental research supports the idea that Black candidates face significant hurdles in gaining 
support from White voters.   In one study, Nayda Terkilsden found that given two fictitious 
candidates described identically on dimensions other than race, White voters are more likely to 
vote for the White candidate over either a dark-skinned or light-skinned Black candidate.59  
Furthermore, racially prejudiced White voters express more negative attitudes about Black 
candidates than less prejudiced ones.60 
 
Experimental research by Donald Kinder and David Sears demonstrates the mechanism 
through which race can influence voting.61  They tested competing theories of White prejudice 
against Blacks—realistic group conflict theory (emphasizing tangible threats that Blacks might 
pose to White’s private lives) and symbolic racism (emphasizing moralistic resentment of 
Blacks)—as predictors of Whites’ voting behavior.  Specifically, they tested these theories in 
light of the 1969 and 1973 Los Angeles mayoral campaigns in which Thomas Bradley 
(Black/liberal) and Samuel Yorty (White/conservative) were the candidates.62  They found both 
that more prejudiced individuals supported Yorty and that symbolic racism better predicts White 
voting behavior than does group conflict theory.63 
  
The success of Black candidates is related to several factors: First, Whites are less likely 
to engage in racial cross-over voting (in mayoral, city council, congressional elections) when the 
incumbent is White.  They are also less likely to vote for Black candidates who run for higher-
                                                                                                                                                             
Minority Percentages in Districts and the Election of Minority-Preferred Candidates, in RACE AND REDISTRICTING 
IN THE 1990S 13-38 (Bernard Grofman ed., 1998). 
59
 Nayda Terkilsden, When White Voters Evaluate African-American Candidates: The Processing 
Implications of Candidate Skin Color, Prejudice, and Self-Monitoring, 37 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1032, 1040 (1993). 
 
60
 Id. at 1043.   
61
 See generally Donald R. Kinder & David O. Sears, Prejudice and Politics: Symbolic Racism Versus 
Racial Threats to the Good Life, 40 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 414 (1981). 
 
62
 Id. at 417, 419.   
63
 Id. at 421-26. 
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level (i.e., top (city)) positions.  Furthermore, Whites are less likely to engage in cross-over 
voting in general elections than in run-off elections.  They are also less likely to engage in cross-
over voting when the local press does not endorse the Black candidate.64   
 
 Second, few Blacks vis-à-vis Whites at the community level have a negative impact on 
Whites’ crossover voting.65  That is, presumably, as close inter-racial interactions increase, “the 
probability that [Whites] will adopt political attitudes and behaviors similar to those [Blacks] 
with whom they interact increases.”66  At the macro-level (e.g., statewide), with more Blacks vis-
à-vis Whites, the perception of racial threat provokes negative reactions to Black candidates 
among Whites.  Among the factors that seem to enhance such sentiments are the size of the 
Black population,67 the history of race relations in the community, and the salience of racial 
issues in the campaign.68 
 
2. Gender and Voting 
Blatant and widespread discrimination among the electorate against female candidates 
has diminished considerably in recent years.  Moreover, compared to race, gender has been less 
of a divisive issue among the electorate.  Some studies have found that voters harbor little bias 
against women;69 and in some instances, women candidates may have an advantage over their 
                                                 
64
 Charles S. Bullock, III, Racial Crossover Voting and the Election of Black Officials, 46 J. POL. 238, 247 
(1984).  Endorsements of the Black candidate, by local white-controlled newspapers, in biracial elections provide 
White voters with “important voting cues as to the candidates’ qualifications and political acceptability.”  Joel 
Lieske, The Political Dynamics of Urban Voting Behavior, 33 AM. J. POL. SCI. 150, 154 (1989). 
65
 Thomas M. Carsey, The Contextual Effects of Race on White Voter Behavior: The 1989 New York City 
Mayoral Election, 57 J. POL. 221, 225-27 (1995); Lisa C. DeLorenzo et al., The Impact of Crossracial Voting on St. 
Louis Primary Election Results, 33 URB. AFF. REV. 120, 125-30 (1997).  
66
 Carsey, supra note 65, at 223. 
67
 V.O. KEY, JR., SOUTHERN POLITICS IN STATE AND NATION 5 (Alfred A. Knopf ed., 1949) (indicating that 
Whites fear maintenance of control over Blacks where Blacks are a large part of the population). 
68
 Thomas Pettigrew, Black Mayoral Campaigns, in URBAN GOVERNANCE AND MINORITIES 5 (Herrington 
J. Bryce ed., 1976); RAYMOND E. WOLFINGER, THE POLITICS OF PROGRESS 15 (Prentice Hall1974).  
69
 See, e.g., Carol Chaney & Barbara Sinclair, Women and the 1992 House Elections, in THE YEAR OF THE 
WOMAN 123-39 (Elizabeth Adell Cook et al., 1994). 
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male counterparts.70  Once on the ballot, women are as successful as men at gaining elected 
office.71  
This is not to say that there are not gender divisions among the electorate.  Since Ronald 
Reagan’s first presidential term, a partisan gender gap has existed in national elections; women 
voters disproportionately favor Democratic candidates, and men generally lean toward 
Republicans.72  Furthermore, women voters frequently favor Democratic Party policies. 73  But 
this has not led candidates to engage in a gender analogue to race-baiting.74  The reason for this 
might be that most successful women politicians are themselves people whose profile is counter-
stereotypical.  As such, they do not seem as vulnerable to subtle efforts to invoke stereotypes.  
And there is no contemporary history of an analogous Bradley Effect in elections involving 
women.75   
 
Yet scholars find that gender stereotyping, linked to traditional sex-roles, still pervades 
electoral politics.76  Experimental research by Leonie Huddy and Nayda Terkildsen, for example, 
finds that women candidates who demonstrate stereotypically female characteristics are at a great 
disadvantage.77  Similarly, voters who place priority on issues such as terrorism, homeland 
                                                 
70
 See id.  
71
 Leonie Huddy & Theresa Capelos, Gender Stereotyping and Candidate Evaluation: Good News and Bad 
News for Women Politicians, in THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF POLITICS 30 (Victor C. Ottati et al., eds., 2002). 
72
 ELEANOR SMEAL, WHY AND HOW WOMEN WILL ELECT THE NEXT PRESIDENT 69-77 (1984). 
73
 See Mark Schlesinger & Caroline Heldman, Gender Gap or Gender Gaps?: New Perspectives on 
Support for Government Action Policies, 63 J. POL. 59, 73-83 (2001). 
74
 See Parks & Rachlinski, supra note 2. 
75
 See id.  The Bradley Effect, named for former Mayor Tom Bradley of Los Angeles, is the tendency for 
polls to overestimate White support for a Black political candidate. Kent Jenkins, Jr. & R.H. Melton, Wilder Revels 
in His Triumph: Slim Margin Puzzles Analysts, WASH. POST, Nov. 9, 1989, at A1. 
76
 Deborah Alexander & Kristi Andersen, Gender as a Factor in the Attributions of Leadership Traits, 46 
POLI. RES. Q. 527 (1993); KATHLEEN A. DOLAN, VOTING FOR WOMEN: HOW THE PUBLIC EVALUATES WOMEN 
CANDIDATES 8-9, 59-67 (2004); RICHARD LOGAN FOX, GENDER DYNAMICS IN CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS 173-75 
(1997); David Niven, Party Elites and Women Candidates: The Shape of Bias, 19 WOMEN & POL. 57 (1998); Kira 
Sanbonmatsu, Gender Stereotypes and Vote Choice, 46 AM. J. POL. SCI. 20, 28-30 (2002). 
77
 Leonie Huddy & Nayda Terkildsen., The Consequences of Gender Stereotypes for Women Candidates at 
Different Levels and Types of Office, 46 POL. RES. Q. 503, 518 (1993). 
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security, and U.S. involvement in Iraq are more likely to believe that a man would do a better job 
of handling those issues as president.78  Furthermore, party leaders primarily want to find 
candidates who will win, and they are as much aware of the stereotypes as researchers.  Party 
leaders believe that there tends to be more uncertainty about a woman’s electability than a 
man’s.79 
 
C. Race and Gender in the 2008 Campaign 
 
Parks and Rachlinski fairly exhaustively address the various ways in which race and 
gender expressly manifested themselves in the 2008 election.80  Their research provides a great 
deal of context and nuance to this issue and connects these forms of bias in the campaign with 
Title VII case law.  The exit polls, however, provide the clearest and most concise indication of 
race and gender bias.   
 
 Blatant and express racial attitudes played a significant role in the 2008 presidential race. 
As illustrated in Tables 1, Whites in 27 out of 37 primaries/caucuses, for which we have exit poll 
data, voted for Senator Clinton in higher numbers than Senator Obama.  For some voters, the 
simple fact that Senator Obama is Black was enough for them to dislike him.  There were reports 
of Senator Obama’s campaigners having dogs sicked on them, being called “nigger”, and being 
told by voters—in reference to Senator Obama—“Hang that darky from a tree.”81  In fact, as 
illustrated in Table 2, in states where voters indicated that race was a deciding factor for them 
when casting their votes, 16 out of 28 went to Senator Clinton.  This was most pronounced in 
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West Virginia and Kentucky.  Such preferencing of a White candidate over a Black candidate 
simply because of race implicates Title VII.   
 
As illustrated in Tables 1, men in 27 out of 37 primaries/caucuses, for which we have exit 
poll data, voted for Senator Obama in higher numbers than Senator Clinton.  As illustrated in 
Table 2, however, in states where voters indicated that gender was a deciding factor for them 
when casting their votes, only six out of 29 went to Senator Obama.  Among these states, one 
state was Illinois; the other five were states with sizeable Black populations.  These results 
suggest that though gender was a factor in the 2008 presidential campaign, it may not have been 
as large a factor as race.  Openly acknowledged male support for Senator Obama, at least, seems 
to be complicated by home-state advantage and votes arising from racial solidarity.   
     
D. Intersectionality and Employment Discrimination 
 
Race and sex are among the determining factors for a prima facie showing of 
employment discrimination.82  And though color is yet another determining factor for a prima 
facie showing of employment discrimination,83 colorism (discrimination based upon gradations 
in skin color) claims are one example of the more complex race discrimination claims courts 
face.84  Arguably, racism (including colorism) and sexism are interconnected systems of 
                                                 
82
 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1994).  The statutory language 
expressly provides that “[it]shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer … to fail or refuse to hire or 
to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, 
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin.” Id. 
83
 Id.  
84
 See, e.g., Taunya Lovell Banks, Colorism: A Darker Shade of Pale, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1705, 1744 
(2000); see generally Leonard M. Baynes, If It's Not Just Black and White Anymore, Why Does Darkness Cast a 
Longer Discriminatory Shadow than Lightness? An Investigation and Analysis of the Color Hierarchy, 75 DENV. 
U. L. REV. 131 (1997); Trina Jones, Shades of Brown: The Law of Skin Color, 49 DUKE L.J. 1487 (2000). 
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discrimination and oppression.85  And the juncture at which they intersect provides a fruitful and 
unique area of discrimination study.86 
 
A number of employment discrimination cases have wrangled with the intersection of 
race and gender with particular regard to Black women.  Some circuits fail to demonstrate an 
appreciation of this race-gender interaction.  For example, in DeGraffenreid v. General Motors 
Assembly Div., five Black women sued their former employer charging, among other things, that 
the company’s seniority system and “last hired-first fired” layoff policy was discriminatory.87  
The plaintiffs sought to represent a class of exclusively Black women who were the victims of 
GM’s alleged discrimination.88  The Eighth Circuit held that the plaintiffs were not allowed to 
create a “super-remedy” by combining both race and sex discrimination.89  In Payne v. Travenol 
Laboratories, Inc., Payne (a Black woman) and several other plaintiffs sued their employer for 
discrimination based on differential referrals of men and women to certain positions and the 
absence of Black employees above a certain level.90  The Fifth Circuit held that the interests of 
the Black women plaintiffs conflicted with those of Black men, since the plaintiffs attempted to 
prove that men were promoted at women’s expense despite the court’s finding of racial 
discrimination.91  In Moore v. Hughes Helicopter, Inc., Moore (a Black woman) claimed that her 
class of Black women employees had been discriminated against in the selection of employees 
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for various labor grades and positions.92  The Ninth Circuit refused to allow Moore to represent 
White females, because she did not claim to be discriminated against because she was female, 
but because she was a Black woman.93  Similarly, Moore was not allowed to represent Black 
male employees, because she did not believe Black males were discriminated against by 
supervisors.94  As such, the class was not certified due to inadequate representation.95   
  
Other circuits, however, have acknowledged the realities of intersectionality.  In Jenkins 
v. Blue Cross Mutual Hospital Insurance, Inc., Jenkins (a Black woman) sued her employer on 
her behalf and that of her class.96  The suit alleged denial of promotions, better assignments, and 
ultimately termination for “race, sex, and black styles of hair and dress.”97  After relying on 
Vuyanich v. Republic National Bank,98 the Seventh Circuit held that the plaintiff was eligible to 
represent a class of Blacks and women.99  In Jeffries v. Harris County Community Action Assoc., 
Jeffries (a Black woman) sued her employer on the grounds that during the nearly four years she 
was employed, she failed to receive any promotions.100  When she applied for a field 
representative position during her fourth year with the company, a Black man was promoted over 
her.101 In looking to the specific language of Title VII,102 the Fifth Circuit construed “or” to 
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imply congressional “intent to prohibit employment discrimination based on any or all of the 
listed characteristics.”103 
 
E. The Race/Gender Nexus and Michelle Obama 
 
Research from the realms of political science and law illustrate two important challenges 
for Michelle Obama.  With regard to gender, a significant challenge for Mrs. Obama is to not 
wield too much power or influence.  As much progress as women have made in electoral politics, 
the role of First Lady has evolved more slowly.104  Historically, First Ladies have served 
conventional roles.  Not only did they served as the official hosts to the White House,105 they 
also reached out to women during their husbands’ campaigns,106 served as a liaison between the 
White House and women’s organizations,107 and promoted the administration’s women-oriented 
programs and policies.108  However, First Ladies are now faced with the paradox of traditional, 
aristocratic demands that they act like "ladies" and more modern demands that they be models of 
social concern and actively involved in the political agenda.109  To the extent that First Ladies 
fail to conform to these constrained gender roles, the more critical the media reacts to them.110  
Put differently, the more politically active First Ladies are, the more negative press coverage 
they receive.111  Being outspoken and recognized for her centrality in her husband’s campaign, 
voter attitudes towards Michelle Obama are likely to be influenced by gender. 
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With regard to race, Mrs. Obama may be perceived as “too Black.”  To some degree, this 
idea may be taken literally.  People have long held more negative attitudes towards darker-
skinned Blacks vis-à-vis those who are fairer skinned.112  For instance, light-skinned Blacks are 
perceived as more attractive than dark-skinned Blacks, which is largely the case for Black 
women.113  As such, Black women’s greater approximation to Whiteness is deemed to be a 
particularly feminine characteristic among Blacks,114 and may be so among Whites as well.  
More fitting, however, is a less literal and more philosophical assessment of Michelle Obama’s 
blackness.  Blacks who downplay their race and attempt to assimilate with the larger White 
society are deemed to be less threatening by Whites than those who assimilate less.115  And those 
Blacks who assimilate more are, in turn, viewed as “good Blacks” by Whites.116  Preference for a 
White over Black is neither a dichotomous issue nor a simple matter of skin color.  Perceptions 
about a Black person’s racial ideology, on a continuum, may also provoke discrimination.  In the 
employment context, for example, Gordon v. JKP Enterprises, Inc. held that a Black plaintiff 
was discriminated against by her employer for being “too ethnic” or “pro-Black.”117  Thus, being 
pointed about racial issues, or at least more so than Senator Obama, race may influence voters’ 
attitudes about Mrs. Obama. 
 
Much research on discrimination has focused separately on the effects of race or gender, 
ignoring the implication that black women must deal with the joints effects of multiple minority 
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statuses, originally termed “double jeopardy”.118  However, interactive models note black 
women’s unique social location at the intersection of different status hierarchies, which produces 
experiences that are distinctly different from those of white women.119  Such models further 
highlight the challenges faced by Michelle Obama.  Specifically, the intersection of Michelle 
Obama’s racial and gender identity and politics—discussing issues of race, critiquing her 
husband openly and honestly, and discussing work-family balance for women—could ultimately 
leave voters fearing that she is an “angry Black woman”120 or both wondering and critiquing, 
“Why is she so womanish?”121 
 
II. 
IMPLICIT BIAS AND VOTER/EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 
 
Undeniably, Americans have made tremendous progress with regards to attitudes about 
race and gender in the past several decades.  This progress, however, has primarily occurred at a 
surface-level within society.  Research on implicit attitudes, which are judgments that are 
automatically activated without a person’s awareness or intention,122suggests that negative, 
stereotypical attitudes about Blacks and women are still pervasive.  These attitudes are, arguably, 
evidenced in both voting and employment decisions.  
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A. Implicit Attitudes 
People’s reports of their cognitive processes are often not consistent with their 
judgments.123  Many influences on judgment seem to operate outside of people’s awareness.124  
Combining this observation with contemporary research on thought-processing, psychologists 
now argue that people rely on parallel cognitive systems of judgment:  one is rapid, intuitive, and 
unconscious; the other is slow, deductive, and deliberative.125  The intuitive system can often 
dictate choice, with the deductive system lagging behind, struggling to produce reasons for a 
choice that comports with the accessible parts of memory.  Thus, an intuitive, gut reaction 
against a candidate can dictate choice.  The rational account only follows later, and might not 
provide a fully accurate account of the decision. 
  
Research on implicit bias indicates that race and gender biases can influence 
unconscious, emotional processes, wholly apart from the conscious, rational ones.126  
Psychologists term these unconscious, emotional influences “implicit biases”—meaning attitudes 
or thoughts that people hold but might not explicitly endorse. 127   These attitudes might conflict 
with expressly held values or beliefs.  Many people who embrace the egalitarian norm that skin 
color should not affect their judgment of a job or political candidate also unwittingly harbor 
                                                 
123
 See, e.g., Timothy D. Wilson & Richard E. Nisbett, The Accuracy of Verbal Reports about the Effects of 
Stimuli on Evaluations and Behavior, 41 SOC. PSYCHOL. 118, 121-23, 125, 127 (1978). 
124
  See id. 
125
  See Chris Guthrie et al., Blinking on the Bench:  How Judges Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 6-9 
(2007) (reviewing this literature).   
126
 See Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scientific Foundations, 94 CAL. 
L. REV 945, 951 (2006). 
127
 Anthony G. Greenwald & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Implicit Social Cognition: Attitudes, Self-Esteem, and 
Stereotypes, 102 PSYCHOL. REV. 4, 5 (1995); see also Brian A. Noesk et al., The Implicit Association Test at Age 7: 
A Methodological and Conceptual Review, in SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY AND THE UNCONSCIOUS: THE AUTOMATICITY OF 
HIGHER MENTAL PROCESSES 266 (John A. Bargh ed., 2007). 
 22 
negative associations about minorities.128  People might not even be aware that they hold these 
attitudes.129  Even so, these implicit cognitions influence how people evaluate others.130  The 
implicit cognitive processes might heavily influence the final choice of a voter who does not 
otherwise clearly embrace one candidate over another.131     
 
Over the last ten years, psychologists have identified ways to measure these implicit 
cognitions.  These measures have proven to be particularly useful for studying bias against 
Blacks or stereotypes about women.  This is so for two key reasons.  The first is that when 
explicit measures are used, individuals may not reveal their true attitudes or preferences because 
of social desirability biases, thus not elucidating the actual magnitude of the relationship that 
would exist between attitudes and, for example, political outcomes.  The second comparative 
advantage of implicit measures is that individuals may not even be aware of their true 
preferences or attitudes.132 
 
The Implicit Association Test (“IAT”) has rapidly become the most widely used measure 
of implicit bias.133  The IAT is a procedure that seeks to assess latent attitudes by measuring their 
underlying automatic evaluation.134  Using cognitive priming procedures, it measures the relative 
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strength of associations between pairs of concepts to determine automatic affect or attitude. In 
the initial IAT task, participants are required to separate different images into categories (e.g., 
race, gender, weight, etc.).  Next, participants are required to sort different attributes as pleasant 
or unpleasant in meaning.  In the next steps, the images and attributes are superimposed, pairing 
images with closely associated and not-so-closely associated attributes.  Because the more 
closely associated two concepts are, the easier it is to respond to them as a pair.  Thus, the IAT 
measures relative strength of associations between targets and certain attributes based on the 
difficulty (i.e., response time) of the sorting process. 
 
1. Race 
Research on the IAT, which pairs White and Black faces with positive and negative 
words, shows that roughly 70% of Whites harbor anti-Black/pro-White biases.135  Web-based 
IAT samples with thousands of participants reveal strong biases with several characteristics: 
People associate light skin with good and dark skin with bad;136 White faces with harmless 
objects and Black faces with weapons.137  The proper interpretation of these results has been a 
matter of some debate,138 but most scholars conclude that the IAT can measure implicit biases.139 
 
A study by Leslie Ashburn-Nardo and colleagues shows just how broad based implicit 
biases can be.  In this study, participants found it easier to associate their in-group (i.e., 
American names) with pleasant words and the out-group (i.e., Surinam names) with unpleasant 
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words than they found it to make reverse pairings, even though participants lacked experience 
with Surinam.140  Even with equally unfamiliar exemplars for both in-group and out-group, they 
nevertheless displayed a pro-in-group IAT bias.  Thus, even with only minimal experiential or 
historical input, peoples’ minds are prepared to display bias, effortlessly.141   
 
 Thierry Devos and Mahzarin Banaji, in their study, found that individuals make no 
distinction between Blacks and Whites on explicit measures of “Americanness.”  On implicit 
measures, however, participants more easily paired American symbols with White faces than 
with Black faces.142  In a second study, Devos and Banaji used photos of eight Black and eight 
White U.S. track and field athletes who participated in the 2000 Olympics. The assumption was 
that Blacks who represented their country in the Olympics should appear more American than 
those who did not.  For the measure of familiarity, participants reported being more familiar with 
Black athletes than with White athletes.  Taking the two explicit self-report measures together, 
participants were both more familiar with Black than White athletes and reported a stronger 
association between Black athletes and American than White athletes and American.  On the 
IAT, however, the reverse was found, with White athletes being more strongly associated with 
the category “American” than Black athletes.143  White and Asian Americans associated Whites 
with the concept “American” to a greater extent than Blacks.144  Furthermore, in a study by 
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Melissa Ferguson and colleagues, they found that when Whites and Asians are primed (where 
individuals are subliminally shown images) with the American flag, their attitudes toward Blacks 
become even more negative.145 
 
 A study by Phillip Goff and colleagues investigated the relationship between implicit 
racial attitudes and dehumanization of Blacks.  In their first study, individuals were subliminally 
shown images of Black faces, White faces, or neutral images.  Then they were shown fuzzy 
images of animals (apes and non-apes), which gradually became clearer.  Individuals were 
instructed to indicate the point at which they could identify the image.146  Goff and colleagues 
found that both Whites and non-Whites more quickly associated Blacks, as compared to Whites, 
with apes.147  In a second study, individuals were first subliminally shown images of ape line 
drawings or jumbled line drawings.  Second, they were given a facial interference task designed 
to gauge how distracted participants would become when presented with faces prior to a test 
measuring their attentional bias to Black and White faces.148  Their results indicated that priming 
individuals with images of apes demonstrated more attentional bias towards Black faces.149  
Moreover, Goff and colleagues found that implicit anti-Black biases predict this ape-Black 
association.150 
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These biases, generally, begin at an early age.  Baron and Banaji assessed White 
American 6-year-olds, 10-year-olds, and adults using a child-oriented version of the IAT.  
Remarkably, even the youngest group showed implicit pro-White/ anti-Black bias, with self-
reported attitudes revealing bias in the same direction.  The 10-year olds and adults showed the 
same magnitude of implicit race bias, but self-reported racial attitudes became substantially less 
biased in older children and vanished entirely in adults, who self-reported equally favorable 
attitudes toward Whites and Blacks.151  It seems that people learn bias early, but only later learn 
to cover the bias by publicly embracing more egalitarian norms. 
 
 The latter point shows the striking divergence between explicit attitudes towards race and 
measures of implicit bias.152  Although explicit and implicit measures of bias are related, even 
people who openly embrace egalitarian norms often harbor very negative associations 
concerning Blacks.153  Even participants who are told that the IAT measures undesirable racist 
attitudes and who explicitly self-report egalitarian attitudes find it difficult to control their biased 
responses.154  These findings suggest that the explicit and implicit studies measure somewhat 
different cognitive systems.  The explicit measures show that most adults have learned the 
importance of egalitarian norms, or at least the importance of embracing such norms publicly. 
 
2. Gender 
The research on implicit bias also indicates that most people hold implicit biases about 
gender.  People misattribute high status more readily to unknown men than to unknown 
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women.155  They associate male with hierarchical and female with egalitarian156 and evaluate 
male authority figures more favorably than their female counterparts.157  Priming people to think 
about dependence or aggression influences their judgments of men and women; they judge 
women, but not men, as more dependent while thinking about dependence and judge men, but 
not women, as more aggressive while thinking about aggression.158  Men also automatically 
associate maleness with power.159   
 
Not surprisingly, these attitudes towards men and women translate directly into 
evaluations of potential careers.  Web-based IAT studies reveal that people more closely 
associate men with science and women with humanities.160  People more easily associate 
“engineer” with men and “elementary school teacher” with female than the opposite pairing.161  
In one study, participants primed with words associated with historically male roles (like 
“doctor”) tended to categorize a subsequent gender-neutral pronoun as being male, while 
participants primed with words associate with historically female roles (like “nurse”).162  Like 
studies of racial bias, even participants who explicitly reject gender-based stereotypes concerning 
careers carry these implicit biases.163  Web-based IAT studies also reveal that both men and 
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women tend to link “male” with “career” and “female” with “family.”164  Among men, this 
connection is consistent with their explicit statements about gender stereotypes, although women 
explicitly reject such connections as inconsistent with their beliefs. 
 
 Like implicit race biases, many of the associations involving gender cast men in a more 
favorable light. However, the relationship involving gender is somewhat more complicated.  
Women reveal a strong automatic preference for female words (e.g., “her” or “she”) over male 
words (e.g., “him” or “he”), although men do not harbor a preference.165  Moreover, women’s 
automatic in-group bias is much stronger than men’s in-group bias, although this tendency is 
most pronounced among women who have positive self-esteem.166  Rudman and Greenwald 
captured the essence of this phenomenon with two phrases characterizing women and men, 
respectively: “If I am good and I am female, females are good,” and “Even if I am good and I am 
male, men are not necessarily good.”167  Rudman and Greenwald also discovered, in two other 
studies, that individuals harbor a pro-female bias to the extent that they favor their mothers over 
their fathers168 and associate maleness with violence, all at the implicit level.169 
  
3. Implicit Bias and Political Attitudes/Behavior 
Research has shown that implicit attitudes influence prejudice and intergroup 
discrimination in a variety of contexts170 – including voting process. Social scientists who have 
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failed to find racial polarization in voters’ candidate preferences have readily acknowledged 
“covert racism”171 or voter “misreporting”172 as explanations for why they failed to detect results 
in their studies.  However, research on implicit bias and political attitudes and behavior seems to 
provide a better link between people’s racial attitudes and their voting behavior.   For example, 
people who endorse right-of-center political views also tend to associate Black with bad and 
White with good on the IAT.173  Similarly, political conservatism is associated with White in-
group favoritism on both implicit and explicit measures.174   
 
Implicit attitudes affect how people vote.175  In one study, Kam examined the impact of 
an implicit measure of attitudes towards an ethnic group on citizens’ willingness to support a 
minority candidate.176  She either identified the candidates’ party affiliations, or omitted that 
information.177  She found that for the implicit measure, Democrats who held the most favorable 
views towards Hispanics were nearly four times as likely to prefer the Hispanic candidate 
compared with their counterparts who held the least positive implicit views towards Hispanics.  
Implicit measures of attitudes towards Hispanics were much less relevant when party cues were 
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available, however.178  Even participants who expressed highly negative implicit attitudes 
towards Hispanics nevertheless voted for Hispanic candidates identified as being from the 
political party that they favor.179  This suggests that Democrats can overcome their implicit 
biases in an effort to vote for a Democrat regardless of race.  This theory, however, may only 
extend to minority candidates who are not Black—assuming Whites harbor more animosity 
toward Blacks than other racial minorities.  
 
Recent, unpublished research by Albertson and Greenwald links implicit attitudes with 
the Bradley Effect.180  Their study (conducted before the 2008 primaries began), measured both 
implicit and explicit preferences by voters for three Democratic hopefuls—Clinton, Edwards, 
and Obama.  When voters were asked who they said they supported, Obama won handily, 42% 
to 34% and 12% for Clinton and Edwards, respectively.  But Obama came in third, with 25% on 
implicit measures, with Clinton and Edwards capturing 48 and 27% of the participants’ support.  
This study, while preliminary, provides the most direct evidence that Senator Obama faces a gap 
between what voters will tell pollsters and how they will vote.    
 
Other research has explored the implicit association between the categories of White and 
America in the 2008 election.181 Devos and colleagues found that people more easily associated 
Senator Clinton and even Tony Blair with the category “American” than they did Senator 
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Obama.182  In another study by Melissa Ferguson and colleagues, when Whites and Asians were 
primed with images of the American flag, their attitudes toward democrats were not altered, but 
their attitudes toward Blacks generally, and Senator Obama specifically, become more 
negative.183 
 
B. Implicit Attitudes and Employment Discrimination 
In recent years, implicit bias has been imported into legal scholarship.  The role of 
implicit bias in employment discrimination was advanced by Linda Hamilton Krieger almost a 
decade and a half ago.  In her seminal work, Kreiger presented three broad ideas:  First, 
stereotyping is not intent-driven but evolves from social cognition theory.  Social cognition 
assumes that, quite naturally, “cognitive structures and processes involved in categorization and 
information processing can in and of themselves result in stereotyping and other forms of biased 
intergroup judgment previously attributed to motivational processes.”184  Furthermore, it is not 
only “bad” people who stereotype; as part of “normal cognitive functioning,” all people 
categorize and stereotype natural objects as a way “to simplify the task of perceiving, processing, 
and retaining information about people in memory.”185  Second, stereotypes unintentionally bias 
people’s judgment about members of other groups.186  Third, stereotypes are triggered and 
operate outside of one’s own conscious awareness.187 
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Kreiger, in turn, applied these principles to the area of Title VII jurisprudence.  Her 
contention and critique revolved around certain assumptions that Title VII cases make about 
human inference and judgment.  First, discriminatory motive or intent drives intergroup 
discrimination.188  Currently under Title VII, a disparate treatment plaintiff must prove that 
purposeful or intentional discrimination resulted in differential treatment.189  In the context of 
race, discrimination results from the decision-maker's racial animus towards members of the 
plaintiff’s racial group.190  Few Title VII cases acknowledge unconscious race bias,191 whereas 
cases have acknowledged the role of unconscious gender stereotyping.192  Kreiger argues that 
there is a logical connection between implicit biases and intentional discrimination in three ways.  
First, stereotypes bias decision-making through the conscious use of race and sex as a proxy for 
some other characteristic stereotypically associated with group membership.193  Second, 
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evidence of stereotyping suggests discriminatory intent if stereotypes are understood as one’s 
expectations about how members of a particular group should behave.194  Third, statements 
reflecting stereotyped views represent discriminatory animus where discrimination is seen as 
resulting from prejudice where prejudice consists of “a cognitive component (stereotypes), an 
affective component (aversion or dislike), and a behavioral component (discrimination aimed at 
creating or enforcing social distance).”195 
 
The second erroneous assumption is that unless employers harbor discriminatory intent or 
motive, they will be rational actors.196  As such, proving discriminatory intent in the employment 
context is a high hurdle to overcome.197  Under the analytical framework established by Texas 
Dep’t of Community Affairs v. Burdine and McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, proof of 
disparate treatment is evinced by three steps:  First, pretext analysis begins when the plaintiff 
presents a prima facie case of discrimination.198  In response, the defendant to articulate has the 
burden of producing legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its decision to engage in the action 
at issue as it pertains to the plaintiff.199  Second, the plaintiff can prevail only by proving that the 
defendant’s proffered reason was not the “true reason” for the decision,200 but merely a “pretext 
for discrimination.”201  According to Krieger’s research, “[t]he most common method of proving 
pretext is to show that the employer’s proffered reason is not worthy of credence either because 
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it appears implausible in light of data upon which such an employment decision should have 
been based, or because it appears inconsistent with decisions reached in similar cases involving 
employees outside of plaintiff’s protected class.”202 
 
The third assumption is that disparate treatment jurisprudence does not account for the 
fact that race and sex categorization “may distort perception, memory, and recall for decision-
relevant events such that, at the moment of decision, an employer may be entirely unaware of the 
effect of an employee's group membership on the decision-making process.”203  In essence, 
according to Kreiger, current disparate treatment jurisprudence wrongly construes how 
discriminatory motivation accounts for judgmental strategies that employers’ use in decision-
making.  This occurs in three ways: First, it assumes that discrimination occurs when a decision-
maker refuses to consider an individual for a particular position.  Further, it assumes that the 
decision arises out of antipathy for that individual’s social group or because placing the 
individual in the position in question violates role expectations for members of the individual’s 
social group.204  Second, disparate treatment jurisprudence assumes that stereotypes can cause 
discrimination when group status is consciously used as a “proxy” for some other job-relevant 
trait.205  Third, it assumes that discrimination occurs at the precise moment of the employer’s 
decision-making.206 
 
                                                 
202
 Kreiger, supra note 172, at 1179.  Kreiger goes on to provide examples such as “(1) Evidence that the 
objective data maintained by the defendant did not support the result reached by the decisionmaker; (2) Evidence 
that the decisionmaker seemed to undervalue or ignore facts favorable to the employee; (3) Evidence that the 
decisionmaker made a judgment about the plaintiff without being able to point to specific events which would 
reasonably support such a judgment; or (4) Evidence showing that similarly situated Anglo employees were on 
occasion treated more favorably.”  Id. at 1180. 
203
 Kreiger, supra note 172, at 1167. 
204
 Id. at 1181-82. 
205
 Id. at 1182. 
206
 Id. at 1183. 
 35 
The final assumption of disparate treatment jurisprudence is that decision-makers possess 
adequate access to their own thoughts as to why they will make or have made certain 
decisions.207  As such, it assumes that decision-makers are aware of the reasons why they will 
make, or have made, employment decisions.208  With such knowledge, well-intentioned decision-
makers comply with Title VII.209  In contrast, decision-makers with bad intentions know when 
they are taking an employee’s group status into account; when challenged, they design “pretexts” 
to cover their tracks.210  
 
Though it may not be routine for courts to analyze employment discrimination through an 
unconscious bias lens, such analysis is not new. Courts have refused to grant defendant-
employers summary judgment in Title VII cases given employers’ “hidden or unconscious 
[discriminatory] motives.”211  In fact, Shaw v. Cassar highlighted that: 
 
“Overt and blatant discrimination is a relatively rare phenomenon .... It is intentional 
discrimination in its covert hidden form that now poses the real problem. Evidence of illicit 
intent may be extremely difficult to obtain, whether the responsible individuals are conscious 
of their bias, and therefore likely to try to hide it, or whether they are expressing unconscious 
bias through some discretionary decisionmaking process.”212 
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Courts have similarly found that unconscious race bias213 and gender stereotyping214 may be 
implicated under Title VII.  Parks and Rachlinski’s research suggests that unconscious race bias, 
and to some degree gender stereotyping, have been pervasive in the 2008 presidential campaign.  
And such biases are analogously manifested in Title VII case law.215  
 
C. Unconscious Voter Bias and Their Evaluation of Michelle Obama 
 
Given espoused societal norms of fairness and egalitarianism within the U.S., explicit 
racism and sexism do not likely underlie most citizens’ attitudes about Mrs. Obama.  However, 
the findings of implicit bias research suggest that voters’ negative attitudes about her likely arise 
from unconscious attitudes about race and gender. Such unconscious bias is evident in critiques 
of Michelle Obama, as her detractors have mostly analyzed her and her actions in ways that 
indirectly allude to her gender and/or race.   
 
For instance, in describing her physical features, one commentator on The Huffington 
Post indicated that Mrs. Obama was reminiscent of Zira—one of the characters on Planet of the 
Apes.216  This comment, if not a blatantly racial attack, which it did not seem to be, is explainable 
by Goff and colleagues’ research on Whites’ unconscious association of Blacks with apes.217  
The use of the ape image in depicting Blacks has been held to be probative in employment 
discrimination cases.218 
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Whites’ unconscious attitudes about Mrs. Obama, however, likely go beyond her physical 
appearance and go to her philosophical leanings.  For example, the fact that she is a Black person 
may be less of an issue for some White voters than the fact that she has a strong racial ideology. 
Preference for greater approximation to the majority, phenotypically speaking, happens even at 
the unconscious level.219  Analogously, it may also be the case with regards to ideology.220  In 
the employment context, plaintiffs have been held to have discriminated against Black 
employees for being deemed “too ethnic” or “pro-Black.”221   
 
With regards to gender, just as voters have expectations about what roles their First Lady 
can and should assume,222 there may also be an unconscious underpinning to this as well.  For 
example, voters may have the unconscious expectation that Mrs. Obama fit within a certain 
gendered paradigm, philosophically.  Being an opinionated Ivy League graduate and lawyer may 
not fit with these expectations.  Though Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins did not speak in terms of 
unconscious gender stereotyping, it was clear that the plaintiff in that case had to walk a 
tightrope with having to be masculine enough to compete in a male-dominated environment for a 
promotion on one hand and not be too masculine on the other hand.223   
 
Finally, even where critiques of Mrs. Obama have been more substantive—e.g., 
comments about being proud of her country—these criticisms too fall within the implicit bias 
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paradigm about race and Americanness.224  Under Title VII, courts have held that excluding 
employees beyond the bounds of patriotism based on race establishes a prima facie case for 
employment discrimination.225 
 
III. 
THIRD-PARTY STANDING AND VOTER/EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 
No empirical research has been conducted on the role of candidates’ third-party 
associations and individuals’ attitudes and voting behavior towards those candidates.   But it 
stands to reason that negative depictions reflect not only upon (potential) First Ladies but upon 
their spouses as well.  As commentators expressly noted in discussing Michelle Obama, “In 
modern politics, the marriage partnership is integral to the quest for the presidency, as voters 
evaluate a candidate in light of the relationship with his or her spouse.”226  As such, in this 
section we seek to shed light on this position by exploring the treatment of associative 
discrimination under Title VII law.  
 
A. Third-Party Associative Discrimination 
 
In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, the Supreme Court delineated the requirements 
for a prima facie case of discrimination under Title VII.227  This standard, requiring that the 
plaintiff be a member of a protected class, is not uniformly easy to plead—especially when the 
plaintiff’s claim of discrimination is associative.228  Third-party associative discrimination is 
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discrimination against individuals due to their relationship with Title VII protected class 
members.  This type of discrimination claim is difficult to make, because the plaintiff is not 
necessarily a member of a protected class.229  Strictly construed, none of the Title VII categories 
are broad enough to protect a discriminated against third-party.230  In fact, the statutory language 
seems to limit claims under Title VII to instances that arise “because of such individual’s race, 
color, religion, sex, or national origin.”231  
 
 Early cases dealing with third-party associative discrimination under Title VII held that 
plaintiffs lacked standing.  In1973,  the Alabama district court held in Ripp v. Dobbs House, Inc. 
that a White man who was terminated from his job due to his association with Black co-workers 
lacked standing.232  The court indicated that the plaintiff was “not a ‘person aggrieved’ within the 
contemplation of the Act.”233  In 1981, the Northern District of Georgia decided in Adam’s v. 
Governor’s Committee on Postsecondary Education that the plaintiff (White), who alleged 
employment discrimination for having a Black wife, lacked standing.234  The court relied on the 
rationale propounded in Ripp.235  Two years later, in Parr v. United Family Life Insurance Co., 
the Northern District of Georgia affirmed its decision in Adam’s when it refused to allow a White 
plaintiff to state a cause of action under Title VII, based on the fact that he was married to a 
Black woman.236  
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One of the first cases to sustain a cause of action for third-party associative 
discrimination was the 1975 case of Whitney v. Greater New York Corp. of Seventh-Day 
Adventists.237  In Whitney, a White plaintiff sued her employer after she was allegedly fired for 
having a social relationship with a Black man.238  In rejection of the Ripp analysis, the Southern 
District of New York held that “the plaintiff’s race was as much a factor in the decision to fire 
her as that of her friend.”239  In addition to other district courts,240 various circuit courts have also 
affirmed third-party associative standing.   In 1998, the Fifth Circuit, in Deffenbaugh-Williams v. 
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., held that Title VII prohibits employment discrimination based on 
interracial relationships.241  In Deffenbaugh-Williams, the plaintiff was a White female manager 
discriminated against because of her relationship with a Black male sales associate.242  A year 
later in Tetro v. Elliot Popham Pontiac, Inc., Tetro (a White male employee) indicated that he 
began to be treated differently by his employer once he noticed that Tetro had a bi-racial 
daughter.243  The Sixth Circuit held that Tetro’s discharge was within the scope of Title VII.244  
In 1996, the Tenth Circuit, in Zeigler v. K-mart Corp., held for the plaintiff, a Black woman, who 
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married a White male employee and had a child by him.245   Under Title VII and the Pregnancy 
Discrimination Act, the court found that Wal-Mart discriminated against the plaintiff based upon 
her interracial marriage and ensuing pregnancy.246  In Parr v. Woodmen of the World Life 
Insurance Co., Parr (a White man) sued under Title VII, asserting that he was fired because he 
was married to a Black woman.247  The Eleventh Circuit expressly repudiated Ripp and held for 
the plaintiff.248  
 
B. What This Means for the Senator Obama’s Candidacy 
Although associative discrimination has not received specific attention in social science 
literature, the findings of social identity theory highlights categorization processes that motivate 
intergroup attitudes and behavior.249  Because individuals are assumed to have a desire to 
maintain a high level of self-esteem,250 the theory suggests that people engage in social 
comparisons with others to seek a positively-valued distinctiveness for the social categories to 
which they belong as compared to other categories.251  As individuals define themselves in terms 
of specific group memberships, they come to view and evaluate themselves based on the 
prototypical characteristics of the group.252  By engaging in social comparisons, people 
differentiate between their in-groups and relevant out-groups, and are able to evaluate their social 
identities.253  Beyond such differentiation, social identity research also demonstrates that people 
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tend to hold differential expectancies about the behavior of in-group and out-group members. In 
particular, they expect in-group members to display more desirable and fewer undesirable 
behaviors than out-group members.254  Furthermore, they are more likely to infer negative 
dispositions from undesirable out-group behaviors than from undesirable in-group behaviors and 
are less likely to infer positive dispositions from desirable out-group behaviors than from 
desirable in-group behaviors.255 
 
Such associative discrimination has been observed within political contexts. For example, 
during Jesse Jackson’s 1984 presidential run, there was tremendous pressure on him to reject and 
denounce a person who ultimately became a litmus test for many Black leaders—Minister Louis 
Farrakhan.256  Similarly, during the current campaign, Senator Obama had to “reject and 
denounce” Minister Farrakhan simply because Minister Farrakhan made some positive remarks 
about Senator Obama.257  More recently, Senator Obama has received considerable criticism for 
his association with his former pastor, Reverend Jeremiah Wright, who some Whites perceive to 
be racist and unpatriotic.258   
 
In light of these occurrences, Michelle Obama may bring a considerable amount of 
baggage to her husband’s campaign. Given implicit attitudes based on gender and/or race, voters 
may hold negative perceptions of Mrs. Obama. But ultimately, the person who bears th e burden 
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of these voters concerns is Senator Obama, as voters’ attitudes about Michelle Obama may 
indirectly affect their decision to support Senator Obama’s candidacy.  Optimistically, the 
findings of research exploring the reputations of women who were associated with U.S. 
Presidents suggest that this might not be the case.259  According to Simonton’s study, the direct 
association between Presidents’ and First Ladies’ reputations can be described as a “reflected-
glory effect”, as the President’s reputation was found to contribute to the First Lady’s reputation 
although there was no reciprocal effect.260  However, because the study’s sample only included 
first ladies up to Nancy Reagan, we have little insight into the effects of gender roles and 
attitudes post-1989 on the study’s findings.261  Further, the influence of race might represent an 
important boundary condition to the study’s findings.262  Thus, voters’ perceptions of Michelle 
Obama, and the subsequent influence on Barack Obama’s candidacy, have important 
implications for understanding the associative discrimination phenomenon. 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
 Americans have made remarkable gains with regards to race and gender issues.  But even 
as late as 2008, the reality of color and gender equality and blindness is still illusive.  Moreover, 
despite the significant possibility that the forty-fourth President of the United States will be a 
Black person or a woman, the candidacies of Senators Obama and Clinton highlight the realities 
of implicit bias in politics.  This implicit bias, though, is not bound by the four corners of 
presidential campaigning.  An appropriate corollary is the employment sphere given the 
analogous decision-making processes in both.  And just as courts and commentators have begun 
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to think about the role of the intersection of race and gender, implicit bias, and third-party 
associative discrimination in Title VII cases, it seems fitting that all three should be applicable to 
the 2008 presidential race with Michelle Obama being the point of analysis.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
